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This research presents the preliminary results of an ongoing research that further explores the
results obtained during the decision-making game “Do probabilistic forecasts lead to better
decisions?”, which Ramos et al (2012) conducted at the EGU General Assembly 2012 in the
city of Vienna. In that game, several cases of flood forecasts with and without uncertainty
information were presented to the participants, together with choices of actions to take. As
decision-makers, they had to decide whether to open or not a gate which was the inlet of a
retention basin designed to protect a town and face the consequences of making a bad decision:
if they decided to open the gate, the retention basin was flooded and the farmers in this basin
demanded a compensation for flooding their land; if they decided not to open the gate and a
flood occurred on the river, the town was flooded and they had to pay a fine to the town. A
conclusion of that game was that, in the absence of uncertainty information, decision makers
are compelled towards a more risk-averse attitude. In order to explore to what extent the
answers were driven by the way the questions were framed, we repeated exactly the same
experiment with a group of students that followed the Hydroinformatics for Decision Support
module, at UNESCO-IHE, Delft. In addition to the original experiment, we introduced a slight
variation consisting on choosing between a sure value (for either loosing or winning with a
giving probability) and a gamble, in a similar way that the one presented by Kahneman and
Tversky (1979). Results show that the way how the questions are posed plays an important role
in decision making and that Prospect Theory concepts are promising to be included in future
modeling approaches, for instance Agent-Based Models.
INTRODUCTION
The process required to translate information about natural hazards into meaningful decisions
often follows a path that considers data collection, modelling and decision-making. However, in
practice, each of these steps has an associated uncertainty and therefore the decision-making
process carried out at the end is often difficult. A typical example is the decision whether or not
to issue an alert for either evacuating an urban area or not, given a potential flood thread, based
on forecasting systems that are imperfect and that may result in false alarms and missed events
[1]. In this respect, during the last years important research efforts have been invested in
increasing the reliability of probabilistic hydro-meteorological forecasts as well as ways of
communicating the probabilistic forecasts to decision-makers [2]. However, as pointed out by
[3] “The risk associated with environmental hazards depends not only on physical conditions,

but also on human actions, conditions, decisions and culture”. Although literature on risk
decisions from physical and behavioural sciences is varied and extensive, they are not yet
integrated and the nature of the decision maker is rarely considered.
To contribute to the discussion regarding the use of deterministic or probabilistic
information for decision-making, we explore the effects of different representation of this
information on the decision-maker, analyzing how the rationality of the decisions may be
hindered by the way the information is presented. To this end, the concept of Prospect Theory
[4] is used as a step forward on the understanding of how decision-makers of different nature
can deviate from rational decisions.
PROSPECT THEORY
The basic idea of Prospect Theory is that people make decisions based on the potential
value of losses and gains rather than the final outcome [4]. This implies that rational decisions
are not necessarily chosen even if those are totally based on facts. Far from defining rational as
a synonym of wise or lucid, we define a rational as the individual that always prefer the option
that gives more over the option that gives less. In other words, a rational decision maker will
always choose the alternative with the highest expected value.
The on the most famous examples of Prospect Theory is given in [5], in which a group of
people are confronted to the following problem:
Your country is preparing for an outbreak of a disease which is expected to kill 600 people.
Choose between the following two options:
Program A: will save 200 for sure
Program B: There is 1/3 probability that 600 will be saved
For which the majority chose program A. In a second experiment, the same question is
posed, now selecting between the following options:
Program C: 400 will die for sure
Program D: There is 1/3 probability that nobody will die
For which the majority chose program D, which is interesting because both problems are
the same, so the choice C would be the same as the choice D.
Prospect Theory states that, in general, people 1) have different risk attitudes towards gains and
losses; 2) care more about potential losses than potential gains; 3) tend to overweight extreme
but improbable events and underweight common events.
METHODOLGY
We explore Prospect Theory concepts using the decision-making game “Do probabilistic
forecasts lead to better decisions?” conducted at the EGU General Assembly 2012 in the city of
Vienna and that is fully described and analyzed by [2]. In that game, several cases of flood
forecasts with and without uncertainty information were presented to the participants, together
with choices of actions to take. As decision-makers, they had to decide whether to open or not a
gate which was the inlet of a retention basin designed to protect a town and face the

consequences of making a bad decision: if they decided to open the gate, the retention basin
was flooded and the farmers in this basin demanded a compensation of 2000 tokens for flooding
their land; if they decided not to open the gate and a flood occurred on the river, the town was
flooded and they had to pay a fine of 7000 tokens to the town. A conclusion of that game was
that, in the absence of uncertainty information, decision makers are compelled towards a more
risk-averse attitude.
In order to explore to what extent the answers were driven by the way the questions were
framed, we repeated exactly the same experiment with a group of students that followed the
Hydroinformatics for Decision Support module, at UNESCO-IHE, Delft. In addition to the
original experiment, we introduced a slight variation consisting on choosing between a sure
value (for either loosing or winning with a giving probability) and a gamble, in a similar way
that the one presented by [4]. We rephrase the problem (Game 1) as follows:
What option would you prefer?
Option 1: lose 2000 for sure
Option 2: the following gamble:
 Lose 7000 with a probability P
 Lose nothing with a probability of 1-P
Where the probability P corresponds to those used in the Vienna’s game at each round. Option
1 corresponds to the situation where the gate is opened (so 2000 tokens would have to be paid),
and the option 2 corresponds to the situation where the gate is closed, case that can be seen as a
gamble, in which the probability P of flooding occurrence determines the likelihood of having
to pay the fine of 7000 tokens. A new round (Game 2) was made framing now the question as
follows:
What option would you prefer?
Option 1: the following gamble:
 Win 7000 with a probability P
 Win nothing with a probability of 1-P
Option 2: win 2000 for sure
In Game1 the question is framed on losses and the gamble is the Option 2, whereas in Game2
the question is framed on gains and the gamble is the Option 1. Both games are equivalent in
terms of the expected value of the choices.

PRELIMINARY RESULTS AND FUTURE WORK
Table 1 summarizes the results obtained after playing the original game (with probabilistic
information) and the modified game (rephrased as a choice between a sure outcome and a
gamble) with 37 students. Both followed exactly the same order of the questions as presented in
[2]. In addition, the table includes the resulting response if expected value is used and the
outcome of the event (flooded / not flooded).

Table 1. Choices for gate opening for the original and modified game

Option 1
Open
Game 1
(lose for
sure)

Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q5
Q6

2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000

Option 2
don’t
open Expected Value
(P of
of loosing
losing
7000)
Opt 1 Opt 2
0.10
2000 681.8
0.48
2000 3378.9
0.13
2000 877.1
0.24
2000 1651.3
0.20
2000 1407
0.53
2000 3721.9

Rational
choice

% students
choosing
gamble

Group
choice

Group
choice
Original
Game (2)

Gamble
Sure loss
Gamble
Gamble
Gamble
Sure loss

84%
19%
81%
57%
76%
0%

Gamble
Sure loss
Gamble
Gamble
Gamble
Sure loss

0 (gamble)
1 (sure loss)
0 (gamble)
1 (sure loss)
1 (sure loss)
1 (sure loss)

*game involving probabilities, see [2] for details
Results indicate that framing the EGU 2012 problem as selecting between a gamble and a sure
loss is beneficial, in the sense that rational choices were selected. The choices in the proposed
Game 1 are different to the choices poised in the original game for questions Q4 and Q5, which
involve probabilities 0.24 and 0.20 respectively.
In addition, answers to questions Q4 and Q5 show stronger disagreement among students of the
same groups. The gamble was not selected in questions involving probabilities around 50% (Q2
and Q6) as occurred with the group choice in the original game.
Although the experiment carried out independently for the two groups of students gave the
same figures, more experiments must be carried out to confirm the conclusions.
Prospect Theory provides the basis to understand how framing the questions in probabilistic
hydro-meteorological forecasting and decision making. Future work includes the demonstration
of the consequences of different decisions, leading to different future scenarios as a new way to
account for social aspects within the hydrological practice and modelling, and contributing to
the development of rules for Agent-Based Models.
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